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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Petitioner's motion is not properly before the Supreme Court 
on Certiorari. There is no final agency order in this case. 
Petitioner's motion is pre-mature because it appeals from an 
interlocutory order. The Utah Supreme Court has held that "parties 
must exhaust administrative remedies as a prerequisite to seeking 
judicial review. ..." Merrihew v. Salt Lake County Planning, 659 
P.2d 1065, 1067 (Utah 1983). 
In Sloan v. Bd. of Rev, of Industrial Comm'n., 781 P.2d 463, 
464 (Utah App. 1989), the Court held that a remand order in an 
administrative hearing was not a final appealable order. Likewise, 
Mr. Barney's interlocutory order on the double jeopardy issue is 
not a final order. The Court stated that "an order of the Agency 
is not final so long as it reserves something to the agency for 
further decision." Id. 
In Eliason v. Buhler, et at., (order of the Utah Court of 
Appeals, case no. 900518-CA, December 5, 1990), the Court of 
Appeals noted that the ALJ's "final order" is "his order 'at the 
close of [the instant] adjudicative proceeding.'" JEci., citing 
U.C.A. § 13-1-12(1) (a) (Supp. 1990). When the Utah Court of 
Appeals addressed the jurisdictional issue in its decision, it 
stated, "The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over 
proceedings of state agencies." Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) 
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(Supp. 1991). This statute does not authorize the* court to review 
the orders of every administrative agency, but allows judicial 
review of agency decisions "when the legislature expressly 
authorizes a right of review." DeBrv v. Salt Lake County Bd. of 
Appeals, 764 P.2d 627, 628 (Utah App. 1988). 
Proceedings in the Division are governed by the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(l) 
(1989) grants this court jurisdiction to review final agency 
actions resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings. See Barney 
v. Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing, (Utah Court 
of Appeals case no. 910755-CA March 26, 1992). 
Furthermore, Petitioner improperly seeks a review of the 
administrative decision rather than seeking a review of the Court 
of Appeals decision. In a recent case of Butterfield v. Okubo, No. 
900272, slip opinion at 6 n.2 (Ut. Sup. Ct., April 17, 1992), the 
Supreme Court stated that to address other than the Court of 
Appeals decision is an improper use of the Certiorari procedure. 
The Utah Supreme Court stated: 
Many lawyers, after a writ of certiorari has been 
granted, ignore the court of appeals' decision to 
which the writ applies and brief the correctness or 
incorrectness of the trial court ruling as though 
we were considering that ruling instead of the 
court of appeals'. In fact, on occasion, the 
briefs filed with this court appear to be only 
copies of those originally filed with the court of 
appeals. Given the relatively new existence of the 
court of appeals and certiorari procedure in Utah, 
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such an approach may be understandable, though 
wrong. But five years have passed since the court 
of appeals was created. We take this opportunity 
to remind the bar that when exercising our 
certiorari jurisdiction granted by section 78-2-
2(3) (a), we review a decision of the court of 
appeals, not of the trial court. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a). Therefore, the briefs of the 
parties should address the decision of the court of 
appeals, not the decision of the trial court. To 
restate the matter: We do not grant certiorari to 
review de novo the trial court's decision. See 
Utah R. App. P. 46. Accordingly, Petitioner's 
motion before the Utah Supreme Court improperly 
seeks a writ of certiorari to review the 
administrative ruling. 
Subject to clearly defined exceptions, the Rules of the Utah 
Court of Appeals and the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allow appeal 
only from the final judgment that concludes that action. See Pate 
v. Marathon Steel Co., 692 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah 1984); Backstrom 
Family Ltd. Partnership v. Hall, 751 P.2d 1157, 1159 (Utah App. 
1988). The exceptions to the general rule are an interlocutory 
appeal under Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 5 or an appeal of an 
order properly certified by the trial court as a final order for 
purposes of appeal under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Based on 
the above analysis, the Utah Supreme Court does not have 
jurisdiction over this matter. 
3 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Interpretation of the following statutes and rules is 
determinative of this appeal: Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-2(6) (1953); 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a); Utah Code Ann. Title 58; 2 Am.Jur. 
2d, 21 392; Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11; 5 C. Wright A. 
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1333 at 177 (1987 Supp); 
Rules Utah Court of Appeals 40(a); Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure 33, 40; Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 46. (Appendix 
A) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Petitioner is licensed by the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing to administer a Health Care Facility. The 
Division is empowered to suspend, revoke or place on probation the 
license of any licensee who is or has been guilty of unprofessional 
conduct, as defined by statute or rule. (See § 58-1-2(6) Utah Code 
Ann. (1953)) On May 2, 1991, the Division filed its initial 
petition alleging that the petitioner engaged in unprofessional 
conduct including physically abusing four patients, administering 
contaminated medicines, and administering medication without a 
physician's order. On July 22, 1991, the Division filed an amended 
petition alleging similar conduct. 
On May 14, 1990, Petitioner was found by the Second Circuit 
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Court to be not guilty of assault of one of the four patients. On 
April 25, 1991, charges of "Abuse of Mentally 111 Persons" were 
dismissed. Petitioner moved to dismiss the Division's petitions on 
grounds that the proceeding constituted double jeopardy under the 
federal and state constitutions, and on a claim that the Division 
did not have subject matter jurisdiction under the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act. Administrative Law Judge Steve 
Eklund denied the initial motion to dismiss on August 2, 1991, and 
denied the motion to dismiss the amended petition on October 30, 
1991. 
Petitioner then filed a Petition for Agency Review, requesting 
a review of the denial of the motion to dismiss. On December 18, 
1991, the agency issued an order denying Petitioner's request for 
agency review of the denial of the motion to dismiss. Petitioner 
then appealed the Motion to Dismiss with the Court of Appeals. 
The Court of Appeals dismissed the matter for lack of 
jurisdiction in a published opinion filed March 26, 1992. 
Petitioner subsequently filed a Petition with the Court of Appeals 
for a Stay of Remittitur to file an appeal with the Utah Supreme 
Court. His motion was denied by the Court of Appeals. Petitioner 
now files this Petition for Certiorari dated April 24, 1992, 
requesting that the Supreme Court review the agency action on the 
merits rather than to properly review the denial of the Request for 
5 
Stay of Remittitur. 
Respondent contends Petitioner's Motion is without merit and 
frivolous and should be dismissed. Respondent further requests 
sanctions against Petitioner and his attorney and reasonable 
attorney fees be awarded to Respondent. 
POINT I 
THIS APPEAL IS BROUGHT IN VIOLATION OF RULES 33 AND 40
 # 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE. 
In bringing this appeal, the Petitioner and Attorney Stratford 
have violated Rules 33 and 40, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
which state that no appeal shall be frivolous or brought for the 
purpose of delay. Several cases discuss issues of sanctions and 
attorney's fees raised by these rules. 
In Taylor v. Estates of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163 (Utah 1989) the 
Court stated concerning Rule 40: 
This rulef which mirrors Fed.R.Civ.P. 11, 
'requires some inquiry into both the facts and 
the law before the paper is filed; the level 
of inquiry is tested against a standard of 
reasonableness under the circumstances." 5 C. 
Wright A. Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 1333 at 177 (1987 Supp. ) This 
objective approach allows sanctions to be 
imposed in a greater range of circumstances 
than did the pre-amendment, subjective 'bad 
faith' approach. See Golden Eagle Distrib. 
Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1536-
38 (9th Cir. 1986); Davis v. Veslan Enters., 
765 F.2d 494, 497 (5th Cir. 1985). Cf. Cadv 
v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151-52 (Utah 1983) 
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(pre-amendment case employing subjective 'bad 
faith' analysis). . . However, in a number of 
cases this court has imposed sanctions 
pursuant to our rules, including R. Utah 
Ct.App. 40(a) which imposes a similar duty on 
litigants and their counsel. Brigham City v. 
Mantua Torn, 754 P.2d 1230, 1236-37 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988); Porco, 752 P.2d 365, 369 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1988); Backstrom Family Ltd. 
Partnership v. Hall, 751 P.2d 1157, 1160 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1988); Barber v. The Emporium 
Partnership, 750 P.2d 202, 203 (Utah Ct.App. 
1988); 0'Brian v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306, 310 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987. These cases establish 
that Rule 40(a) imposes a duty to investigate 
the factual and legal basis of an appeal or 
appellate document before filing. See 
Backstrom Family Ltd. Partnership, 751 P.2d at 
1160; 0'Brian, 744 P.2d at 310. Subjective 
intentions are essentially irrelevant; the 
determination of whether the rule has been 
violated is made on an objective basis. Id. 
Except to the extent that a somewhat less 
forgiving approach should perhaps be employed 
at the appellate level, we find that this 
analysis is equally applicable to the 
similarly worded Rule 11. 
A frivolous appeal has been defined as one 
without reasonable legal or factual basis as 
defined in Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals 
40(a). Backstrom Family Ltd. Partnership v. 
Hall, 751 P.2d 1157, 1160 (Utah Ct.App. 1988); 
0' Brian v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306, 310 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1987). Sanctions for bringing a 
frivolous appeal 'should only be applied in 
egregious cases, lest there be an improper 
chilling of the right to appeal erroneous 
lower court decisions.' Porco v. Porco, 752 
P.2d 365, 369 (Utah Ct.App. 1988). The Porco 
court categorized egregious cases as those 
obviously without merit, with no reasonable 
likelihood of prevailing, and which result in 
delay in implementing a judgment. Jd.; see 
also Auburn Harps we 11 Ass'n v. Dan, 438 A.2d 
7 
234, 239 (Me. 1981) (per curiam). (emphasis 
added) 
The Backstrom case, cited above, is a case involving a 
debtor/creditor relationship, this Court stated that "[a]n appeal 
must be well grounded in fact or law and must not be brought for 
the purposes of delay . . . . The decision to appeal should only 
be reached after careful consideration by counsel and client." Id. 
The case at hand is not "well grounded in fact or in law." 
Petitioner and Attorney Stratford are doing little more than re-
arguing their case on appeal in the hopes that this Court will make 
different findings of fact. The administrative court found 
Petitioner's claims were without merit. The Court of Appeals 
subsequently denied the Appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The 
record in support of the appeal before this court is flimsy. The 
only purpose of this appeal is to delay the right of the public to 
have a hearing on the Carl Barney health care licensing issue in 
violation of Rules 33 and 40, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Rule 33 defines a frivolous motion as follows: 
For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous 
appeal, motion, brief or other paper is one 
that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by 
existing law, or not based on a good faith 
argument to extend, modify, or revise existing 
law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper 
interposed for the purpose of delay is one 
interposed for any improper purpose such as to 
harass, cause needless increase in the cost of 
litigation, or gain time that will benefit 
only the party filing the appeal, motion, 
brief, or other paper. 
The Court in Mauahan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156, 162 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989) held that attorney's fees are appropriate in appeals 
which are "obviously without merit, with no reasonable likelihood 
of success, and which result in the delay of a proper judgment." 
In Clark v. Booth, 821 P.2d 1146 (Utah 1991) the Utah Supreme 
Court recently ordered sanctions against a party and her attorneys 
for a "bad faith" and "meritless motion" which had been filed. 
In Taylor, supra, 770 P. 2d 163 (Utah 1989) the Court held sanctions 
were appropriate for a meritless appeal. 
In conclusion, both Petitioner and Attorney Stratford have not 
made good faith arguments, but are simply trying to re-argue their 
case by filing this motion. This practice is in violation of Rules 
33 and 40, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. In the course of 
defending this appeal, Respondents have incurred considerable costs 
and now respectfully urge that sanctions and reasonable attorney's 
fees be imposed. 
Respondent requests the court consider in determining 
reasonable attorney's fees those factors stated in the case of 
Parents Against Drunk Drivers, Assignee of Robert J. Debrv, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Gravstone Pines Homeowners' 
Association, Counterclaimant and Respondent, v. et a h , 789 P.2d 52 
(Utah 1990): 
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Factors which court should consider when 
determining reasonable attorney fee are extent 
of services provided, amount in controversy, 
novelty and difficulty of issues and 
complexity of litigation, reasonableness of 
number of hours expended to reach result in 
case, experience and expertise of attorney, 
fee customarily charged by other attorneys for 
services performed, and how much of the work 
actually performed was necessary to reach 
result. (Id. p. 53) 
POINT II 
THE LAW IS CLEAR THAT DOUBLE JEOPARDY IS NOT A BAR 
TO ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS ON THE SAME SUBJECT 
MATTER DUE TO DIFFERENT STANDARDS OF PROOF. 
A. Significant Cases on the Issues of Double Jeopardy. 
The case of In re McCune, Utah, 717 P. 2d 701 (1986) is a major 
case on the issue of double jeopardy in administrative proceedings. 
In that case, the Utah Supreme Court rejected a claim that double 
jeopardy principles have an application in Utah State Bar 
disciplinary proceedings, the purpose of which "is to maintain the 
honesty, integrity and professionalism of the Bar." Id. at 707. 
By clear and compelling analogy, double jeopardy principles 
should also not apply in disciplinary licensure proceedings. The 
purpose of disciplinary proceedings is "to protect . . . citizens 
from harmful and injurious acts by persons offering or providing 
essential or necessary goods and services to the general public." 
(See § 13-1-1 of Utah Annotate Code, 1953) 
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Acquittal of a petitioner on charges in a criminal prosecution 
was held not to bar a subsequent finding in an administrative 
parole revocation hearing in the case of Johns v. Shulesen, 717 
P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1986). In this case the defendant had been 
acquitted on criminal charges and the same charges were used to 
revoke his parole. The court concluded that the administrative 
proceeding stemmed from a clear violation of the rules and 
regulations imposed as a condition of parole, and that a conviction 
was not requisite to parole revocation. Accordingly, evidence of 
a successful criminal conviction of Mr. Barney is not required to 
prove violation of licensing regulations. 
The difference between administrative proceeding and criminal 
proceedings was further demonstrated in the case of In Re Friedman, 
457 A. 2d 983, 987 (1983). In this case, a Pennsylvania physician 
was the defendant in criminal and administrative proceedings 
brought concerning allegedly immoral and unprofessional actions. 
The doctor was acquitted on the criminal charges and sought to use 
collateral estoppel to prevent the State Board of Medicine from 
revoking his license. On appeal, the reviewing court rejected his 
claims reasoning that there was no identity of issues rbetween 
administrative and criminal matters] in view of the differing 
standards of proof (emphasis added). 
Moreover, in Lvness v. Com. State Bd. of Medicine, 561 A.2d 
11 
362, (PA Commonwealth 1989), the court also held that the physician 
could be guilty of immoral and unprofessional conduct, and still be 
not guilty of a criminal offense (emphasis added). In Zanotto v. 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Dept. of Trans, 475 A. 2d 1375, double 
jeopardy was held not to be an issue in a administrative proceeding 
involving a drivers license matter. The court stated: 
Drivers suspension and revocation proceedings 
are remedial sanctions which are civil in 
nature, designed to protect the public from 
unsafe drivers; as such, they cannot be 
grounds for a double jeopardy challenge*. 
B. Differences in Burden of Proof. 
Utah courts adhere to the general rule that "the comparative 
degree of proof by which a case must be established is the same 
before an administrative tribunal as in a judicial proceeding — 
that is, a preponderance of the evidence." 2 Am.Jur. 2d, § 392. 
In Garcia v. Schwendiman, 645 P.2d. 651 (Utah 1982), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that in an administrative action the 
preponderance of the evidence standard applied. The Court stated 
that: "In contrast to prosecutions under criminal statutes, a 
license revocation proceeding requires proof only by a 
preponderance of the evidence and not beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Id. at 652. Similarly, in workers compensation cases, the Utah 
Supreme Court has held that the preponderance of the evidences 
standard applies. See Lipman v. Industrial Commission, 592 P. 2d 
12 
616 (Utah 1979). See also Walker v. Board of Pardons, 803 P. 2d 124 
(Utah 1990) in which the court stated, "the burden of proof in a 
criminal proceeding is beyond a reasonable doubt . . . in an 
administrative proceeding, it is by a preponderance of the 
evidence." j[d. Therefore, double jeopardy does not apply in the 
case herein, (compare Rogers v. Div. of Real Estate, 790 P. 2d 102, 
105 (Utah 1990)). 
POINT III 
THE DIVISION HAS NOT DEPARTED FROM USUAL AND ACCEPTED 
PROCEDURE IN THIS CASE. 
Mr. Barney alleges that the Division has not been concerned 
with Petitioner's rights. In truth, Petitioner has been afforded 
all due process rights required by the rules and statute. In his 
Petition, Mr. Barney derides the Division for balancing the 
interests of Mr. Barney against the public interest (Brief at p.7). 
In doing so, he ignores the Legislature's stated intent in 
establishing the Department of Commerce. Utah Code Ann. § 13-1-1 
states as follows: 
The Legislature finds that many businesses and 
occupations in the state have a pronounced physical 
and economic impact on the health, safety, and 
welfare of the citizens of the state. The 
Legislature further finds that while the overall 
impact is generally beneficial to the public, the 
potential for harm and injury frequently warrants 
intervention by state government. 
13 
The Legislature declares that it is appropriate and 
necessary for state government to protect its 
citizens from harmful and injurious acts by persons 
offering or providing essential or necessary goods 
and services to the general public. The 
Legislature further declares that business 
regulation should not be unfairly discriminatory. 
However, the general public interest must be 
recognized and regarded as the primary purpose of 
all regulation by state government (emphasis 
added). 
In Cannon v. Gardner, 611 P.2d 1207, 1210 (Utah 1980), the 
Utah Supreme Court interpreted Title 58, Utah Code Ann., as 
follows: 
[I]t's general purpose is to provide for the 
qualification, registration and licensing of 
persons who hold themselves out to the public as 
having qualifications in specialized areas which 
affect the public health, safety or welfare and 
thus to guard against unqualified persons deluding 
others into believing that they are competent to 
render such specialized services. 
In balancing the public's interest against the Petitioner's 
interests, the Division is performing the legislatively and 
judicially mandated duty to the Division and is acting properly. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully requests Petitioner's Writ of 
Certiorari be denied. Respondent's further urges that this Court 
award sanctions and reasonable attorney's fees against Petitioner 
and his attorney for the filing of a frivolous appeal pursuant to 
Rules 33 and 40, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
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!fa DATED this (6 day of May, 1992. 
' < w / 
DELLA M. WELCH 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing Respondent's Reply Brief to Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari was caused to be mailed, postage pre-paid on this [ & 
day of May, 1992 to the following: 
Dale E. Stratford 
2404 Washington Blvd., #1218 
Ogden, Utah 84401 ,' 
Delia M. Welch 
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APPENDIX A 
78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of 
state law certified by a court of the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary 
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect 
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior 
to final judgment by the Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originat-
ing with: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the Board of State Lands and Forestry; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; or 
(v) the state engineer; 
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adju-
dicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (e); 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of 
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the 
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of 
a first degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first de-
gree or capital felony; and 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the 
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the 
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, 
except: 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a 
court of record involving a charge of a capital felony; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) general water abdication; 
(f) taxation and revenue; and 
(g) those matters described in Subsection (3)(a) through (f). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition 
sr VrTit of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the 
upreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals 
nder Subsection (3)(b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Chapter 46b, 
itle 63, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
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(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels; 
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court; 
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of Appeals; and 
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court and the Judicial 
Council. 
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as for the Supreme 
Court. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-2, enacted by L. ficeofajudgeofthe Court of Appeals is 6 years 
1986, ch. 47, i 45; 1988, ch. 248, § 7. and until a successor is appointed and ap-
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- proved under Section 20-1-7.1," into the 
ment, effective April 25, 1988, in Subsection present third and fourth sentences and made 
(1), divided and rewrote the former third sen- minor stylistic changes, 
tence, which read Thereafter, the term of of-
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction [Effective until Jan-
uary 1, 1992]. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs 
and to issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative pro-
ceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of 
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Ser-
vice Commission, State Tax Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of 
Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of 
the state or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from the small claims 
department of a circuit court; 
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from district court in criminal cases, except those involving 
a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by 
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, 
except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence 
for a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, in-
cluding, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child 
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four 
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate 
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review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has 
original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Chapter 
46b, Title 63, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
Court of Appeals jurisdiction [Effective Jan-
uary 1, 1992]. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs 
and to issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative pro-
ceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of 
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Ser-
vice Commission, State Tax Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of 
Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of 
the state or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from the small claims 
department of a circuit court; 
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involv-
ing a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by 
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, 
except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence 
for a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, in-
cluding, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child 
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four 
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate 
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has 
original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Chapter 
46b, Title 63, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-3, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 47, ft 46; 1987, ch. 161,ft 304; 19S8, 
ch. 73, ft 1; 1988, ch. 210, ft 141; 1988, ch. 
248, ft 8; 1990, ch. 80,ft 5; 1990, ch. 224, ft 3; 
1991, ch. 268, ft 22. 
Amended effective January 1, 1992. — 
Laws 1991, ch 268, S 22 amends this section 
effective January 1,1992 See amendment note 
below. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
ment by ch 73, effective April 25, 1988, in-
serted subsection designations (a) and (b) in 
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58-1.1- Short title. 
This chapter is known as the "Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing Act." 
History: C. 1953, 58-1-1, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 187, § 10. 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1985, 
ch 187, § 10 repealed former §§ 58-1-1 to 
58-1-43 (L 1921, ch 130, §§ 1 to 7, 11, 12, 
1923, ch 49, §§ 1, 2, Code Report, R S 1933 & 
C 1943, 79-1-1 to 79-1-4, 79-1-6, 79-1-18 to 
79-1-20, 79-1-22 to 79-1-39, L 1941 (1st S S ), 
ch 28, § 1, 1943, ch 61, § 1, 1953, ch 96, 
§ 1A, 1953, ch 97, § 1, 1957, ch 114, § 1, 
1963, ch 113, § 1, 1963, ch 115, § 1, 1963, ch 
116, §§ l to3,1967, ch 133, § l;1967,ch 134, 
§§ lto3,1969, ch 165, § l,1973,ch 126, §§ 1 
to 3, 1979, ch 11, § 1, 1979, ch 19, § 2, 1981, 
ch 19, § l;1981,ch 34, §§ 1 to 4,1984, ch 67, 
§ 29, 1984 (2nd S S ), ch 15, §§ 62, 63), gen-
eral provisions relating to the division of regis-
tration, and enacted present §§58-1-1 to 
58-1-20 
Effective Dates. — Section 108 of Laws 
1985, ch 187 provided 'This act Ukes effect 
on July 1, 1985 " 
Cross-References. — Divisions created in 
Department of Commerce, § 13-1-2 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
in Utah Lav,, 1986 Utah L Rev 95, 130 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 51 Am Jur. 2d Licenses and 
Permits § 1 et seq 
C.J.S. — 53 C.J S Licenses § 2 et seq 
58-1-2. Definitions. 
For purposes of this title: 
(1) "Department" means the Department of Commerce. 
(2) "Director" means the director of the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing. 
(3) "Division" means the Division of Occupational and Professional Li-
censing. 
(4) "Executive director" means the executive director of the Depart-
ment of Commerce. 
(5) "Licensee" includes any holder of a license, certificate, permit, stu-
dent card, or apprentice card authorized under this title. 
(6) "Unprofessional conduct" means acts, knowledge, and practices 
which fail to conform writh the accepted standards of the specific licensed 
occupation or profession and which could jeopardize the public health, 
safety, or welfare and includes the violation of any statute regulating an 
occupation or profession under this title. 
History: C. 1953, 58-1-2, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 187, § 10; 1989, ch. 225, § 24. 
Repeals and Reenactments. — See note 
under same catchhne following § 58-1-1 
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend-
ment, effective March 14, 1989, substituted 
"Department of Commerce" for "Department of 
Business Regulation" in Subsections (1) and 
(4) 
Cross-References. — Department of Com-
merce, Chapter 1 of Title 13 
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Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery 
of attorney's fees. 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first appeal of 
right in a criminal case, if the court determines that a motion made or appeal 
taken under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just 
damages, which may include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, 
and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court may order 
that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's attorney. 
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion, 
brief, or other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by 
existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or 
reverse existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for 
the purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper purpose such as to 
harass, cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will 
benefit only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper. 
(c) Procedures. 
(1) The court may award damages upon request of any party or upon its 
own motion. A party may request damages under this rule only as part of 
the appellee's motion for summary disposition under Rule 10, as part of 
the appellee's brief, or as part of a party's response to a motion or other 
paper. 
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the court, the court 
shall issue to the party or the party's attorney or both an order to show 
cause why such damages should not be awarded. The order to show cause 
shall set forth the allegations which form the basis of the damages and 
permit at least ten days in which to respond unless otherwise ordered for 
good cause shown. The order to show cause may be part of the notice of 
oral argument. 
(3) If requested by a party against whom damages may be awarded, the 
court shall grant a hearing. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Frivolous appeal. 
—Defined. 
—Sanctions. 
Cited. 
Frivolous appeal. 
A husband's appeal from a judgment relat-
ing to alimony and distribution of marital 
property was frivolous, where there was no ba-
sis for the argument presented and the evi-
dence and law was mischaracterized and mis-
stated. Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395 (Utah 
1987). 
Plaintiffs counsel violated rule and was 
therefore subject to sanction when, after he in-
vestigated plaintiffs malpractice action 
against defendant orthodontist and found that 
he could not prove breach of duty or causation, 
the record was devoid of any relevant, admissi-
ble evidence showing negligence, and after los-
ing on summary judgment, he persisted in fil-
ing an appeal. Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414 
(Utah 1990). 
An appeal brought from an action that was 
properly determined to be in bad faith is neces-
sarily frivolous under this rule. Utah Dep't of 
Social Servs. v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991). 
—Defined. 
For purposes of this rule, a "frivolous" appeal 
is one having no reasonable legal or factual 
basis. Lack of good faith is not required. 
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UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE Rule 40 
A.L.R. — Abatement effects of accused's Key Numbers. — Appeal and Error «= 329 
death before appellate review of federal crimi- et seq. 
nal conviction, 80 A.L.R. Fed. 446. 
Rule 39. Duties of the clerk. 
(a) General provisions. The office of the Clerk of the Court, with the clerk 
or a deputy in attendance, shall be open during business hours on all days 
except Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays. 
(b) The docket; calendar; other records required. The clerk shall keep 
a record, known as the docket, in form and style as may be prescribed by the 
court, and shall enter therein each case. The number of each case shall be 
noted on the page of the docket whereon the first entry is made. All papers 
filed with the clerk and all process, orders and opinions shall be entered 
chronologically in the docket on the pages assigned to the case. Entries shall 
be brief but shall show the nature of each paper filed or decision or order 
entered and the date thereof. The clerk shall keep a suitable index of cases 
contained in the docket. 
The clerk may keep a minute book, in which shall be entered a record of the 
daily proceedings of the court. The clerk shall prepare, under the direction of 
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court or the Presiding Judge of the Court of 
Appeals, a calendar of cases awaiting argument. In placing cases on the calen-
dar for argument, the clerk shall give preference to appeals in accordance 
with the priority of cases provided in Rule 29. 
(c) Notice of orders. Immediately upon the entry of an order or decision, 
the clerk shall serve a notice of entry by mail upon each party to the proceed-
ing, together with a copy of any opinion respecting the order or decision. 
Service on a party represented by counsel shall be made upon counsel. 
(d) Custody of records and papers. The clerk shall have custody of the 
records and papers of the court. The clerk shall not permit any original record 
or paper to be removed from the court, except as authorized by these rules or 
the orders or instructions of the court. Original papers transmitted as the 
record on appeal or review shall upon disposition of the case be returned to the 
court or agency from which they were received. The clerk shall preserve copies 
of briefs and attachments, as well as other printed papers filed. 
Rule 40. Attorney's or party's certificate; sanctions and 
discipline. 
(a) Attorney's or party's certificate. Every motion, brief, and other paper 
of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney 
of record who is an active member in good standing of the Bar of this state. 
The attorney shall sign his or her individual name and give his or her busi-
ness address, telephone number, and Utah State Bar number. A party who is 
not represented by an attorney shall sign any motion, brief, or other paper 
and state the party's address and telephone number. Except when otherwise 
specifically provided by rule or statute, motions, briefs, or other papers need 
not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The signature of an attorney or 
party constitutes a certificate that the attorney or party has read the motion, 
brief, or other paper; that to the best of his or her knowledge, information, and 
belief, formed after reasonable inquiry, it is not frivolous or interposed for the 
purpose of delay as defined in Rule 33. If a motion, brief, or other paper is not 
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signed as required by this rule, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly 
after the omission is called to the attention of the attorney or party. If a 
motion, brief, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the authority 
and the procedures of the court provided by Rule 33 shall apply. 
(b) Sanctions and discipline of attorneys and parties. The court may, 
after reasonable notice and an opportunity to show cause to the contrary, and 
upon hearing, if requested, take appropriate action against any attorney or 
person who practices before it for inadequate representation of a client, con-
duct unbecoming a member of the Bar or a person allowed to appear before the 
court, or for failure to comply with these rules or order of the court. Any action 
to suspend or disbar a member of the Utah State Bar shall be referred to the 
Ethics and Discipline Committee of the State Bar for proceedings in accor-
dance with the Rules of Discipline of the State Bar. 
(c) Rule does not affect contempt power. This rule shall not be con-
strued to limit or impair the court's inherent and statutory contempt powers. 
(d) Appearance of counsel pro hac vice. An attorney who is licensed to 
practice before the bar of another state or a foreign country but who is not a 
member of the Bar of this state, may appear, upon motion, pro hac vice. Such 
attorney shall associate with an active member in good standing of the Bar of 
this state and shall be subject to the provisions of this rule and all other rules 
of appellate procedure. 
Advisory Committee Note. — The rule is court with counsel's Bar number and business 
amended to require that counsel provide the telephone number. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Govert Copier Painting v. Van 
Leeuwen, 801 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Award of damages for dilatory tac- Adequacy of defense counsel's representation 
tics in prosecuting appeal in state court, 91 of criminal client regarding appellate and post-
A.L.R.3d 661. conviction remedies, 15 A.L.R.4th 582. 
Adequacy of defense counsel's representation Attorneys: revocation of state court pro hac 
of criminal client regarding post-plea reme- vice admission, 64 A.L.R.4th 1217. 
dies, 13 A.L.R.4th 533. Key Numbers. — Costs *» 252. 
TITLE VI. 
CERTIFICATION AND TRANSFER BETWEEN 
COURTS. 
Rule 41. Certification of questions of law by United States 
courts. 
(a) Authorization to answer questions of law. The Utah Supreme Court 
may in its discretion answer a question of Utah law certified to it by a court of 
the United States when requested to do so by such certifying court acting in 
accordance with the provisions of this rule, but only if the state of the law of 
Utah applicable to a proceeding before the certifying court is uncertain and 
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TITLE VII. 
JURISDICTION ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO COURT OF APPEALS. 
Rule 45. Review of judgments, orders, and decrees of 
Court of Appeals. 
Unless otherwise provided by law, the review of a judgment, an order, and a 
decree (herein referred to as "decisions") of the Court of Appeals shall be 
initiated by a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Utah. 
Rule 46. Considerations governing review of certiorari. 
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discre-
tion, and will be granted only for special and important reasons. The follow-
ing, while neither controlling nor wholly measuring the Supreme Court's 
discretion, indicate the character of reasons that will be considered: 
(a) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in 
conflict with a decision of another panel of the Court of Appeals on the 
same issue of law; 
(b) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question of 
state or federal law in a way that is in conflict with a decision of the 
Supreme Court; 
(c) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision that 
has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceed-
ings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call 
for an exercise of the Supreme Court's power of supervision; or 
(d) When the Court of Appeals has decided an important question of 
municipal, state, or federal law which has not been, but should be, settled 
by the Supreme Court. 
Rule 47. Certification and transmission of record; filing; 
parties. 
(a) Appearance, docketing fee, filing, and service. Counsel for the peti-
tioner shall, within the time provided by Rule 48, pay the certiorari docketing 
fee and file ten copies of a petition which shall comply in all respects with 
Rule 49. The case then will be placed on the certiorari docket. Counsel for the 
petitioner shall serve four copies of the petition on counsel for each party 
separately represented. It shall be the duty of counsel for the petitioner to 
notify all parties in the case of the date of filing and of the certiorari docket 
number of the case. Service and notice shall be given as required by Rule 21. 
(b) Joint and separate petitions. Parties interested jointly, severally, or 
otherwise in a decision may join in a petition for a writ of certiorari; any one 
or more of them may petition separately; or any two or more of them may join 
in a petition. When two or more cases are sought to be reviewed on certiorari 
and involve identical or closely related questions, it will suffice to file a single 
petition for a writ of certiorari covering all the cases. 
(c) Cross-petition of respondent. Counsel for a respondent wishing to file 
a cross-petition shall, within the time provided by Rule 48(d), pay the certio-
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13-1-1 COMMERCE AND TRADE 
13-1-1. Legislative findings and declarations. 
The Legislature finds that many businesses and occupations in the state 
have a pronounced physical and economic impact on the health, safety, and 
welfare of the citizens of the state. The Legislature further finds that while 
the overall impact is generally beneficial to the public, the potential for harm 
and injury frequently warrants intervention by state government. 
The Legislature declares that it is appropriate and necessary for state gov-
ernment to protect its citizens from harmful and injurious acts by persons 
offering or providing essential or necessary goods and services to the general 
public. The Legislature further declares that business regulation should not 
be unfairly discriminatory. However, the general public interest mqst he rec^ 
ognized and regarded as the primary purpose ol all regulation by state govern-
ment. ~ "" • — ——** 
History: C. 1953, 13-1-1, enacted by L. (1st S S ), ch 5, § 1,C 1943,16A-1-1), relating 
1983, ch. 322, § 1. to creation of the department of business regu-
Repeals and Enactments. — La*s 1963, lation, and enacted present § 13-1-1 
ch 322, § 1 repealed former § 13-1-1 (L 1941 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d — 15A Am Jur 2d Commerce before state administrative agencies 36 
§§ 7 to 34 ALR3d 12 
C.J.S. — 15 C.J S Commerce § 55 Key Numbers. — Commerce •=> 48 
A.L.R. — Hearsa> evidence in proceedings 
13-1-1.1 to 13-1-1.3. Repealed. 
Repeals.— Sections 13-1-1 1 to 13-1-1 3 (L were repealed b\ La*s 1963, ch 322, § 13 
1969, ch 34. §§ 1 to 3), relating to functions of Sections 13-1-1.1 and 13-1-13 were also re-
the department, the executive director and pealed b> Laws 1983 ch 246, § 24 
continuation of the public service commission, 
13-1-2. Creation and functions of department — Divisions 
created — Fees. 
(1) There is created the Department of Business Regulation, hereafter re-
ferred to as the department. The department shall execute and administer 
state laws regulating business activities and occupations affecting the public 
interest. 
(2) There is created within the department the following divisions. 
(a) the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing, 
(b) the Division of Real Estate; 
(c) the Division of Securities; 
(d) the Division of Contractors; 
(e) the Division of Public Utilities; 
(f) the Division of Consumer Protection; and 
(g) the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code. 
(3) Unless otherwise provided by statute, the department may adopt a 
schedule of fees assessed for services provided by the department The fee 
shall be reasonable and fair, and shall reflect the cost of services provided 
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(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply injudicial proceedings under this 
section. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-15, enacted by L. according to the standards of Subsection 
1987, ch. 161, § 271; 1988, ch. 72, § 25. 63-46b-16(4)" at the end in Subsection (l)(a) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- and made minor stylistic changes 
ment, effective April 25, 1988, deleted "except Effective Dates. — Laws L987, ch 161, 
that final agency action from informal adjudi- § 315
 m akes the act effective on January 1, 
cative proceedings based on a record shall be 1933 
reviewed by the district courts on the record 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Function of district court. the district court will no longer function as m-
Section 63-46b-16(l) provides that all final termediate appellate court except to review in-
agency decisions through formal adjudicative formal adjudicative proceedings de novo pursu-
proceedings will be reviewed by the Utah Su- ant to Subsection (l)(a) of this section In re 
preme Court or Court of Appeals Therefore, Topik, 761 P.2d 32 (Utah Ct App 1988) 
63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative pro-
ceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of 
agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required 
by the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern 
all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial 
review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, sum-
marize, or organize the record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and 
copies for the record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to 
shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's 
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substan-
tially prejudiced by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action 
is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any stat-
ute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-mak-
ing process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure; 
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